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Abstract 
We investigate how intertemporal allocation of monetary rewards is influenced by 
the size of total budget, with a particular interest in the channels of influence. We 
find a significant magnitude effect: the budget share allocated to the later date 
increases with the size of the budget. At the aggregate level as well as at the 
individual level, we find magnitude effects both on the discount rate and on 
intertemporal substitutability (i.e. utility curvature). The latter effect is consistent 
with theories in which the degree of asset integration is increasing in the stake.   
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The prediction of the standard consumption-savings model, that people always 
discount an income at the market interest rate, has been found to be inconsistent 
with empirical results.1 One important anomaly, dating back to Thaler (1981), is 
the magnitude effect: when comparing a smaller sooner reward with a larger later 
reward, people favor the later reward more often as the amounts of the two rewards 
are scaled up. Studies on the magnitude effect help us better understand the relation 
between intertemporal choices in the lab and those in the real life, given the fact 
that most lab experiments use small stakes but many choices in the real life involve 
large stakes.  
While a few experiments observed the magnitude effect, little effort is made to 
explore its mechanisms: are people more patient to larger amounts of money, or do 
they find larger amounts of money to be more substitutable across time? Both 
mechanisms account for the magnitude effect in a single-reward task where a 
decision-maker can only receive a reward on a single date (sooner or later), but they 
have different meanings and predict differently in a more general situation. 
Ignorance about the mechanisms makes us unable to predict intertemporal choices 
in general situations. In the meantime, there is not yet any empirical work on how 
intertemporal choices from a set of cash flows (rather than rewards on a single date) 
change as all amounts are scaled up.  
In this paper, we perform a lab experiment to investigate how choices in 
intertemporal allocation tasks change with the magnitude of rewards, and in 
particular, whether the magnitudes impact intertemporal preferences through 
patience (the discount rate) or through intertemporal substitutability (the atemporal 
utility function).  
 
1
 To be more precise, people discount at the market rate unless they do not have enough liquidity to smooth consumption 
between relevant periods.  
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Several experiments on time preferences have reported a magnitude effect.2 
Though most early studies are based on hypothetical decisions, there are also some 
real-stake experiments that found a magnitude effect (Holcomb and Nelson 1992; 
Kirby 1997; Kirby, Petry and Bickel 1999; Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutström 
2013; Sutter, Kocher, Glätzle-Rützler, and Trautmann 2013; Halevy 2015). In this 
literature, little efforts are made to explore the channels of the magnitude effect. 
This is mainly because most studies employed a single-reward task. With a single-
reward task, one cannot disentangle different channels and can only attribute all 
effects to one aggregate measure, the monetary discount rate.  
We are interested in the following question: does the magnitude affect choices 
through the discount rate, or through intertemporal substitutability (utility 
curvature)? It is interesting to disentangle channels because different channels 
predict choices differently in a setting more general than a single-reward task. For 
instance, in intertemporal allocation tasks with varying interest rates, the discount 
rate affects the average choices, while the intertemporal substitutability affects how 
fast a choice changes with the interest rate. The knowledge about mechanisms is 
important for establishing deeper and better-founded descriptive theories of 
intertemporal decision making. Meanwhile, omitting a channel of the magnitude 
effect in an empirical study or in policy making may lead to biased estimates and 
predictions. 
Some existing theories give explanations to the magnitude effect in single-reward 
tasks. Benhabib, Bisin and Schotter (2010) posit that a fixed cost of waiting makes 
people impatient to small outcomes, but it matters less when outcomes are large. 
Noor (2011) establishes a magnitude-dependent discounting model where the 
discount rate of a dated outcome is decreasing in the size of the outcome. Fudenberg 
 
2
 Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue (2002, Section 4.2.2) summarized the early literature on the magnitude effect 
of time preferences. Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2011) also reviewed the more recent literature. 
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and Levine (2006) predict that people exert costly self-control when stakes are high 
but indulge themselves when stakes are low, which generates a magnitude effect. 
Holden and Quiggin (2017) assume that people take into account more background 
consumption when experimental rewards are larger, which also explains the 
magnitude effect in single-reward tasks. When those theories are applied to 
intertemporal allocation tasks with proper extension, Benhabib et al. (2010) and 
Noor (2011) predict a magnitude effect on the discount rate, while Fudenberg and 
Levine (2006) and Holden and Quiggin (2017) predict a magnitude effect on the 
utility curvature. It is thereby interesting to know what kinds of models capture the 
main characteristics of intertemporal choices in a more general setting.  
We employ the Convex Time Budget (CTB) method introduced by Andreoni and 
Sprenger (2012). It allows subjects to form a portfolio of a sooner reward and a 
later reward given a budget constraint. This intertemporal allocation task has a few 
applications in the real life. For instance, people need to decide how to allocate their 
income to the present and to their years of retirement, given the after-tax real rate 
of return. More importantly, the possibility for subjects to make interior choices 
(and not only corner choices as in single-reward tasks) enables researchers to 
simultaneously identify the discount rate and the intertemporal substitutability.3, 4 
The design of our experiment has three main features. First, all subjects receive 
equal amounts of participation fees on the sooner date and on the later date 
regardless of their choices, and the payment conditions are constant across time. 
Thus, the transaction costs and the trustworthiness of the payments are equalized 
 
3
 Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and l'Haridon (2013a) provided another method for measuring intertemporal preferences 
parametrically. Their method identifies utility curvature from marginal utilities for different quantities on the same date, 
while the CTB method identifies utility curvature from sensitivities of choices to interest rates. The two methods are 
equivalent if the true model is with a stationary period utility function and a magnitude-independent discount function, as 
assumed in our paper. If the condition is not satisfied, the former method is better at measuring curvature of a period utility 
function, and the CTB method is better at measuring sensitivity of choices to interest rates (or, elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution).  
4
 A discussion about the rationality of subjects in the CTB task is provided in Appendix A. 
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across periods, and these confounding factors are controlled for. Second, we 
implement two treatments. In one treatment subjects allocate between today and 
four weeks later, while in the other treatment subjects allocate between four weeks 
later and eight weeks later. This allows us to assess whether the magnitude effect 
is affected by the inclusion of a front-end delay. Finally, by assuming a simple yet 
popular model, the CTB method allows us to identify the discount rate and the 
atemporal utility function simultaneously. As a result, we are able to disentangle 
the channels of the magnitude effect.  
We find evidence of the magnitude effect in intertemporal allocation tasks: the 
budget share allocated to the later date is increasing in the total budget. The size of 
the magnitude effect is found to be decreasing in the magnitude. The pattern is not 
affected by whether or not a front-end delay is present. At the aggregate level as 
well as at the individual level, we find magnitude effects both on the discount rate 
and on intertemporal substitutability. Both channels have considerable impacts on 
predicted choices. We find that the latter effect is not the same as the magnitude 
effect on risk attitudes found in previous studies, and hence it might be problematic 
to correct for the curvature of utility functions by risk attitudes. Instead, the 
magnitude effect on intertemporal substitutability is consistent with theories where 
people integrate experimental rewards with more background wealth as the 
magnitude of rewards gets larger.  
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows: We introduce our 
experimental design in Section I. In Section II we formulate our hypotheses. In 
Section III, we investigate non-parametrically the magnitude effect and its relation 
with the front-end delay.  We explore the channels by parametric estimation both 
at the aggregate level and at the individual level in Section IV. In Section V, we 
discuss the interpretations of our findings. We draw conclusions in Section VI.  
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I. Experimental Design 
A. The Convex Time Budget Method, Parameters and Implementation 
The foundation of our experimental design is the Convex Time Budget method 
introduced by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). The method consists of a set of 
intertemporal allocation tasks: in each decision subjects are asked to allocate � 
tokens to two dates, � days from today and ሺ� + �ሻ days from today. Each token 
allocated to � is worth �� euros, while each token allocated to ሺ� + �ሻ is worth ��+� 
euros. Suppose a subject allocates ݊� tokens to the sooner date and ݊�+� to the later 
date, the amount of the sooner reward will be �� = �� ∙ ݊� euros and the amount of 
the later reward will be ��+� = ��+� ∙ ݊�+� euros.  
Choices are subject to the budget constraint, ݊� + ݊�+� ൑ � , and the non-
negativity constraints, Ͳ ൑ ݊� , ݊�+� ൑ �. Subjects are told that they can allocate 
any number of tokens they like to one of the two dates. Examples of both corner 
choices and interior choices are given to remove any hesitation in making either 
type of choices. 
Decisions with the same total budget, �, are grouped in one decision form, which 
is displayed on one page. There are seven decisions in each decision form. The 
return to each token allocated to the later date is fixed as ��+� = €0.20, while the 
return to each token allocated to the sooner date is varied and takes the values �� = 
€0.20, €0.19, €0.18, €0.17, €0.16, €0.15, and €0.14. Hence, those returns imply 
seven gross interest rates, � =1, 1.05, 1.11, 1.18, 1.25, 1.33, and 1.43, respectively, 
over a period of � days. The constraints can be rewritten as  � ∙ �� + ��+� ൑ ݉ ��, ��+� ൒ Ͳ 
where ݉ is the total budget and ݉ = ��+� ∙ �.  
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We implement the CTB method by a zTree program (Fischbacher 2007). Figure 
1 shows the interface of a typical decision form. Each decision takes a row. 
Decisions can be made by scrolling the bars. Once an adjustment is made for one 
decision, the amounts of the sooner reward and of the later reward in that decision 
are automatically calculated and displayed.  
To avoid any possible effects of initial values, the amounts of rewards are initially 
blank. Decisions cannot be submitted until all the scrollbars have been adjusted at 
least once.  
B. Procedures 
There are two parts in our experiment. Part I consists of five decision forms, with � =100, 200, 300, 400, and 800. The order is randomly drawn for each subject. 
Subjects can move to a specific decision form by clicking the button with the 
corresponding number. One can go to any decision form at any time, regardless of 
whether the current decision form is completed. Decisions are automatically stored 
when one switches to another decision form. This makes comparisons across 
magnitudes very easy to the subjects in case they would want to make such 
comparisons. Decisions can only be submitted when all the 35 decisions in the five 
decision forms are completed.  
We randomly assign subjects to one of two treatment groups. In the Present 
Group, the sooner date is today while the later date is four weeks from today, i.e. � = Ͳ and � = ʹͺ. In the Delayed Group, the sooner date is four weeks from today 
while the later date is eight weeks from today, i.e. � = ʹͺ and � = ʹͺ. Comparing 
the two groups enables us to check if there exists a present bias on average, and 
more importantly, if there exists a magnitude effect when no rewards are available 
in the present.   
8 
 
 
Figure 1. Interface of a Typical Decision Form in Part I 
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Part II is composed of an extended CTB decision form with seven decisions. 
Subjects are asked to allocate 400 tokens to three dates, today, four weeks from 
today and eight weeks from today. One additional restriction is imposed, depending 
on which group one is in. A subject in the Present Group can allocate either 0 or 
200 tokens to eight weeks from today; she cannot choose other numbers. But she is 
still free to allocate any number of tokens between today and four weeks from today. 
Similarly, a subject in the Delayed Group can allocate either 200 or 400 tokens to 
today. She is still free to allocate any number of tokens (if there remains some) 
between four weeks from today and eight weeks from today. The restrictions and 
the returns to one token allocated are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Restrictions on the number of tokens and returns to one token allocated to a specific date in Part II 
Group  Today Four weeks from today Eight weeks from today 
Present 
Returns to one 
token 
€0.20, €0.19, €0.18, 
€0.17, €0.16, €0.15, 
€0.14 
€0.20 €0.26 
Restriction on the 
number of tokens 
No additional 
restriction 
No additional 
restriction 0 or 200 
Delayed 
Returns to one 
token €0.08 
€0.20, €0.19, €0.18, 
€0.17, €0.16, €0.15, 
€0.14 
€0.20 
Restriction on the 
number of tokens 200 or 400 
No additional 
restriction 
No additional 
restriction 
 
The additional date (eight weeks from today for the Present Group or today for 
the Delayed Group) is accompanied with a very high return for the Present Group 
and a very low return for the Delayed Group, so that subjects are induced to allocate 
200 tokens to this additional date. If they do so, the remaining task is equivalent to 
the one with a total budget of 200 tokens in Part I. This characteristic makes the 
two decision forms comparable.  
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The purpose of Part II is to test the time separability of intertemporal preferences. 
One alternative hypothesis is that a subject in the Delayed Group may allocate less 
to the sooner date if she has allocated a large amount of money to an even sooner 
date, since the desire for extra consumption has already been partly satisfied. A 
similar hypothesis applies to the Present Group: a subject in the Present Group may 
allocate less to the later date if she has already allocated a large amount of money 
to an even later date, since the guilt for not saving has been partly released. If 
preferences are time non-separable, the use of a model with a time separable 
preference is more likely to be problematic. Thus, we want to test the hypothesis of 
time separability before we perform parametric estimation with a time-separable 
model.  
We do not directly give a fixed reward on the additional date. This is because a 
fixed reward might be mentally isolated from the allocation task due to narrow 
bracketing, and hence the test of time separability in the allocation task may be 
invalid.  
At the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to finish a questionnaire. As in 
previous studies with the CTB method, we asked about subjects’ expenditures in a 
typical week. The average response was €55.22 per week or €7.89 per day.  
C. Experimental Payments 
The payments are composed of two parts. First, all subjects receive a €5 
participation fee on each of the two dates scheduled in Part I. Second, each subject 
has a 10% chance to receive earnings from decisions. Before the experiment starts, 
each subject is randomly given a lottery number, ranging from 0 to 9. After all 
subjects in a session finish the questionnaire, the experimenter invites one of the 
subjects to draw a ten-sided die in front of all subjects in the session. Subjects who 
have a lottery number that equals the die roll get the earnings from decisions. One 
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decision is randomly selected from the 42 decisions in the two parts as the decision 
that counts.  If the decision that counts is from Part I, the allocation in that decision 
will be realized as the earnings from decisions. If the decision that counts is from 
Part II, the allocation will be realized and the subject will also receive a €5 
participation fee on the additional date in Part II; hence a subject will receive three 
participation fees if a decision in Part II is realized. All the rules above were 
articulated in the instructions, and the instructions were always read aloud before 
either part of the experiment.  
The earnings were paid by bank transfer to subjects’ checking accounts. We made 
orders of transfers soon after the experiment and sent reminder emails with 
information about the incoming amounts on the experimental day and on all the 
payment dates. Given the reliability of the banking service, subjects can expect to 
receive all delayed payments exactly on the appropriate payment dates, while some 
of the present payments might be received one day after the experimental day due 
to the inter-bank processing.  
We believe the payment tool we used was as good as cash in terms of liquidity. 
Checking accounts are used in private transactions such as paying for rents. 
Checking accounts are also linked to debit cards. In the Netherlands, debit cards are 
widely used for daily transactions in almost all kinds of stores including 
supermarkets, university restaurants and bookstores without any transaction fees. 
We held a survey about subjects’ use of debit cards in the questionnaire. The 
responses show that bank transfers give high liquidity to the rewards, so that no 
isolation effect should be expected due to the payment method.5 
 
5
 84.7% of the subjects pay at least 50% of their expenditure in general by debit card, while 91.1% pay at least 30% of 
their expenditure in general by debit card. Among those who pay less than 30% of their expenditure in general by debit card, 
61.1% pay at least 30% of their expenditure in university restaurants or in supermarkets by debit card. Among the remaining 
seven subjects, four withdraw cash at least 3 times per month.  
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D. Transaction Costs and Credibility of Payments 
For our experiment, it is extremely important to equalize the transaction costs and 
the trustworthiness of the payments across periods, because a difference in the 
transaction costs over the two periods can be a confounding factor of the magnitude 
effect.  
Several facilities were employed in order to equalize the transaction costs across 
periods and to increase the credibility of the payments. The transaction costs 
include the costs to collect rewards, to confirm that the rewards have been received 
with correct amounts, and to remember the earnings so that they can be consumed 
on the expected dates.  
First, we sent reminder emails with information about the incoming amounts on 
the experimental day and on all the payment dates. Subjects knew this from the 
instructions, so they did not need to worry about forgetting the earnings on the 
payment dates, a situation in which the expected marginal utility of the delayed 
rewards might be lowered.  
Second, as Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) did, we delivered our business card 
and told the subjects to contact us immediately in case they would not receive a 
payment on time. It increased the credibility of payments and meanwhile served as 
a reminder of the payments.  
Third, we asked subjects to fill in a payment reminder card with the amounts of 
their rewards on the corresponding dates just after their earnings were displayed. 
This served as a second reminder in case they forget to check emails.   
In sum, the characteristics that one will receive a participation fee on each 
payment date and that all payments will be received by bank transfer help equalize 
the transaction costs of receiving payments on all dates. At the same time, the 
business cards, the payments reminder cards and the reminder emails reduced the 
risk of forgetting the rewards. The business cards also lowered the perceived default 
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risks. Even though the risk might still be perceived by some subjects, it should be 
equal across periods since the payment tools and all auxiliary facilities were the 
same.  
E. Sample 
Our experiment was conducted at the CentERlab, Tilburg University in 
September of 2014.6 203 students of the university participated in one of the 11 
sessions, 94 in the Present Group and 109 in the Delayed Group. Each subject made 
42 decisions. One session took one hour and ten minutes on average. 22 subjects 
got the earnings from decisions, which averaged €69.16. The overall average 
earning was €17.49.  
II. Hypotheses 
Most previous studies define the magnitude effect in single-reward tasks. Denote 
a reward �� on a sooner date � by ሺ��, �ሻ. In a single-reward task, a subject chooses 
between a sooner reward ሺ��, �ሻ and a later reward ሺ��+�, � + �ሻ, where � > Ͳ is the 
delay. A subject displays a (positive) magnitude effect if for all �� > Ͳ, ��+� > Ͳ 
and � > ͳ,  ሺ��, �ሻ~ሺ��+�, � + �ሻ ⟹ ሺ���, �ሻ ≺ ሺ���+�, � + �ሻ. 
In words, the later reward is more favorable if the amounts are scaled up.  
We adapt the definition of the magnitude effect to the intertemporal allocation 
task. A subject makes a choice �∗ሺ�,݉ሻ out of a linear budget set {ሺ��, ��+�ሻ: � ∙�� + ��+� = ݉}, where �∗ = ሺ��∗, ��+�∗ ሻ. She displays a (positive) magnitude effect 
if for all ݉ > Ͳ and � > ͳ,  
 
6
 The payment dates were in September, October and November. The fall semester in Tilburg University started from the 
end of August and ended in early December. Hence the payment dates were earlier than the final exam weeks and the 
Christmas vocation, which keeps our experiment from their probably large impacts on the subjects’ demand of money.  
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��+�∗ ሺ�,݉ሻ݉ ൑ ��+�∗ ሺ�, �݉ሻ�݉  
and  ��∗ሺ�,݉ሻ > Ͳ ⇒ ��+�∗ ሺ�,݉ሻ݉ < ��+�∗ ሺ�, �݉ሻ�݉ . 
In words, people like to put a larger share of budget on the later date as the total 
budget is increased. She may fail to do so because the sooner reward is already zero. 
The adapted definition is consistent with the original one, because in both cases, 
options with a larger fraction of later reward become more favorable if all options 
in the menu are scaled up in amount.  
Hypothesis 1 (magnitude effect on budget share): �೟+�∗�  is increasing in ݉.  
We are also interested in whether the magnitude effect is affected by the presence 
of a front-end delay. Benhabib et al. (2010) suggest that a fixed cost of delaying 
rewards can account for the magnitude effect in single-reward tasks, since the fixed 
cost matters less as the rewards are scaled up in amount. However, it is not clear if 
this cost is incurred only when a present reward is delayed or if it applies equally 
to delaying a future reward. We thus test whether the magnitude effect is smaller 
or even non-existent if the sooner reward is also in the future.  
Hypothesis 2 (a front-end delay leads to a smaller magnitude effect): �೟+�∗�  
changes less with ݉ in the Delayed Group than in the Present Group.  
The two hypotheses above can be tested without assuming a specific model.  
Conditional on finding a positive magnitude effect, we wish to explore the 
channels of the magnitude effect. As long as time separability is supported by our 
results, we will estimate the parameters of preferences, with the assumption that 
subjects maximize a time separable utility function with CRRA atemporal utility 
functions and quasi-hyperbolic discounting, i.e. subjects maximize 
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 ( 1 ) �ሺ��, ��+�ሻ = ଵ� ��ሺ�� + �ሻ� + ߚ��+� ଵ� ሺ��+� + �ሻ�, 
where ߚ  is the present bias parameter, �  is the daily discount factor, ߙ  is the 
exponent parameter. ��  and ��+�  are the sooner reward and the later reward, 
respectively. �  is the background consumption mentally integrated with the 
experimental reward when the decision is made.  
When the CRRA utility function is assumed, the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution in consumption, �� ≡ − ln(�೟+��೟ )ln(ೠ′ሺ�೟+�ሻೠ′ሺ�೟ሻ ), is equal to ଵଵ−� (�� and ��+� are the 
consumption on the sooner date and on the later date, respectively.). Thus, the 
exponent parameter, ߙ, is a positive transformation of ��. If ߙ → ͳ, the atemporal 
utility function becomes linear, and the elasticity goes to infinity. In that case, 
subjects just go for the largest present value, and hence rewards are perfectly 
substitutable between dates. In case ߙ → −∞, the atemporal utility function is 
Leontief, and the elasticity goes to zero. In that case, subjects always divide the 
total budget into two equal amounts. In general, the larger the value of ߙ, the more 
substitutable the subject considers the two rewards to be. Therefore, ߙ is a measure 
of intertemporal substitutability.  
It brings several advantages to assume such a model. First, the parameters in this 
model have important economic meanings. The discount factor determines the 
average choice across interest rates and hence measures the patience of the subject; 
if a subject is more patient, she will allocate more tokens to the later date for all 
interest rates. The intertemporal substitutability of consumption between different 
points in time relates to the dispersion of the choices across interest rates since it 
measures how sensitive the choices are to the interest rate. These behavioral 
measures are hard to estimate without assuming a model. Due to the non-negativity 
constraint, choices are censored at the corners if the preference parameters are 
extreme. As a result, directly measuring the average choice (as a measure of 
16 
 
patience) and the dispersion of choices (as a measure of intertemporal 
substitutability) leads to biases. In contrast, the model we assume is tractable and 
easy to estimate. Moreover, the model is widely used in both theoretical and 
empirical applications.7  
Given the model above, we test the following two hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 3 (magnitude effect on discount factor): � is increasing in ݉. 
Hypothesis 4 (magnitude effect on intertemporal substitutability): ߙ is increasing 
in ݉. 
 
7
 To address the concern about misspecification, in Appendix C, we check the robustness of our results by estimating a 
model with the Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) utility function and quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The HARA 
utility function is more flexible in the sense that it allows the atemporal utility function to be Increasing, Constant or 
Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion. This kind of flexibility is especially important when the magnitude is varied in the 
experiment. The results are the same.  
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III. Overall Effects 
A. Magnitude Effect on Budget Share 
 
Figure 2. Mean Budget Share on the Sooner Date in Part I 
In Figure 2 we plot the mean budget share allocated to the sooner date against the 
gross interest rate, �, of each CTB decision in Part I.8 We plot separate points for 
the five magnitudes (݉ = €20, €40, €60, €80, €160). The budget share allocated to 
the sooner date declines with the magnitude.  
 
8
 In our data, 28% of the choices are interior, and 62% of our subjects make at least one interior choice. This is very close 
to the 30% and 63%, respectively, in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). The relationships between the budget shares and the 
interest rates are also similar.  
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The difference seems to be larger when the interest rate is smaller but still positive. 
This is mainly due to censoring. When the interest rate is zero (� = ͳ) or the highest 
(� = ͳ.Ͷ͵), most choices are at the corners for both smaller and larger magnitudes.  
To judge whether there is a significant magnitude effect, we perform Hotelling’s 
T-squared tests on the mean differences in budget shares between magnitudes, 
taking seven choices with the same magnitude as a vector (see Table 2).9 The null 
hypothesis is that the means of choices are the same across magnitudes, taking into 
account the correlation within subject. This class of tests makes sense because 
individual heterogeneity may have made different subjects reveal magnitude effects 
on tasks with different interest rates (e.g. Subject 1 on Interest Rate 1 while Subject 
2 on Interest Rate 2), so that the magnitude effects on all choices would be jointly 
significant, but the effect on choices with any single interest rate might be 
insignificant. The results show that the magnitude effect is significant between the 
magnitudes of €20 and €40 and between any two non-adjacent magnitudes. These 
results support Hypothesis 1, which states that a larger share of the budget is 
allocated to the later date when the size of the budget increases.10   
The results also show that the differences are insignificant between adjacent 
magnitudes larger than €20. Since the allocation is monotonic in the magnitude and 
the differences are significant between non-adjacent magnitudes, the insignificance 
suggests that the magnitude effect is the greatest when comparing the smallest 
magnitudes (€20 and €40), and becomes smaller for larger magnitudes. The pattern 
is consistent with the fact that Andersen et al. (2013) found a “statistically 
 
9
 Hotelling’s T-squared test is asymptotically nonparametric, so it can be applied to a large sample in nonnormal cases.  
We also perform a multivariate signed-rank test (Oja and Randles 2004) and the results are basically the same: the magnitude 
effects are significant between the magnitudes of €20 and €40 and between any two non-adjacent magnitudes at least at the 
10% level.  
10
 In Table 2 statistics are reported only for four pairs of non-adjacent magnitudes. The mean differences for the other 
three pairs of non-adjacent magnitudes (in the two groups separately and in total) are also significant: seven out of the nine 
differences are significant at the 1% level, while the other two at the 5% level.  
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significant” but “not economically significant” magnitude effect when they elicited 
time preferences using very high stakes.11 
Table 2. Multivariate mean difference tests between magnitudes 
  €20 ~ €40 €40 ~ €60 €60 ~ €80 €80 ~ €160 €20 ~ €60 €40 ~ €80 €60 ~ €160 
Total 
F-statistic 3.3184*** 1.5477 1.5761 1.7104 5.1162*** 3.9336*** 3.0328*** 
p-value 0.0023 0.1533 0.1444 0.1084 0.0000 0.0005 0.0047 
Present 
Group 
F-statistic 2.4091** 1.2374 1.6696 1.3919 3.2252*** 2.9725*** 2.0495* 
p-value 0.0266 0.2913 0.1270 0.2190 0.0044 0.0076 0.0577 
Delayed 
Group 
F-statistic 2.4388** 1.3650 1.0096 1.3659 2.8009** 2.1048** 2.0595* 
p-value 0.0237 0.2282 0.4290 0.2278 0.0104 0.0495 0.0547 
Notes: Hotelling’s T-squared tests on the mean differences in the budget shares between two 
magnitudes for all gross interest rates. 203 sets of observations for each magnitude. The degrees of 
freedom of the F-statistics are (7,196) in total, (7, 87) in the Present Group and (7, 102) in the 
Delayed Group. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level, and 10 
percent level, respectively. 
The results are robust against multiple hypotheses testing problem, since performing a Holm-
Bonferroni correction on any family of four/three hypotheses does not change the significance at 
the 10 percent level.  
B. Conditional on the Presence of an Immediate Reward? 
We test if the magnitude effect is affected by the existence of a frond-end delay. 
First, Table 2 shows the results of the Hotelling’s T-squared tests on the magnitude 
effects for the Present Group and for the Delayed Group, respectively. We find 
significant magnitude effects in both groups. This implies that the presence of an 
immediate reward is not a necessary condition for the magnitude effect.  
Second, we plot separate graphs for the two groups in Figure 3. Subjects in the 
Delayed Group seem to be slightly more patient than those in the Present Group. 
However, when we perform the Hotelling’s T-squared test on all the 35 decisions 
 
11
 Andersen et al. (2013) compare magnitudes of 1,500 Danish kroner and 3,000 Danish kroner, which are roughly 
equivalent to €200 and €400, respectively. 
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in Part I between groups, the null hypothesis that the two groups have the same 
mean responses is not rejected. The p-value is 0.2424 when the degree of freedom 
is (35, 167). Thus, we find no evidence that the magnitude effect is affected by the 
existence of a front-end delay, and we reject Hypothesis 2.12  
This finding has an implication to the modeling of the magnitude effect: no matter 
what generates the magnitude effect, it applies equally to situations with an 
immediate reward and those without. For instance, if it is a fixed cost of delaying 
rewards that generates the magnitude effect, as proposed by Benhabib et al. (2010), 
the cost applies equally to delaying an immediate reward and to delaying a future 
reward.  
 
 
12
 This result also implies that a present bias is not detected. The present bias here refers to non-stationarity of preferences 
according to the categorization of Halevy (2015). The result of no present bias is consistent with Sutter et al. (2013), and 
does not necessarily contradict the stylized fact that the discount rate is decreasing in the time distance between the sooner 
reward and the later reward, as in Benhabib et al. (2010). That stylized fact and stationarity can hold simultaneously if there 
is subadditivity in discounting (see Read 2001).  
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Figure 3. Mean Budget Shares in the Present Group and in the Delayed Group 
C. Time Separability 
Our results show that Part II is a valid test of time separability, since most subjects 
chose 200 tokens for the additional date in Part II. Only nine out of 203 subjects 
selected a different number than 200 to the additional date, which involved 41 
(2.9%) out of 1415 decisions.  
After removing those decisions, we compare the choices with the magnitude of 
€40 between Part I and Part II, separately for each group. Table 3 shows that the 
Hotelling’s T-squared tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that responses to the 
two parts have the same means. Those results support time separability, which will 
be assumed in the next section.  
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Table 3. Multivariate mean difference tests between Part I and Part II 
Subsample Present Delayed Total 
F-statistic 1.5560 1.4192 1.0979 
Degree of freedom 7, 79 7, 101 7, 187 
p-value 0.1609 0.2058 0.3662 
Notes: Hotelling’s T-squared tests on the mean differences in the budget shares in the decisions with 
the magnitude of €40 between Part I and Part II. Subjects who chose a different number from 200 
tokens for the additional date in Part II such that their choices were not comparable between the two 
parts have been removed from the sample. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent level, 
5 percent level, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
IV. Channels 
In order to disentangle the magnitude effect into two channels, we perform 
parametric estimations both at the aggregate level and at the individual level. We 
then test if the preference parameters change with the magnitude of the total budget.  
A. Aggregate-Level Estimation 
1. Estimation strategy 
In our main specification, we assume a time-separable utility function with 
CRRA atemporal utility functions as in equation ( 1 ).  We set � (background 
consumption) equal to the average response to the question about one’s typical 
daily expenditure, €7.89, as Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) did in two of their 
specifications.13 
Given the intertemporal utility function, solving the optimization problem yields 
the tangency condition 
 
13
 To fix the background consumption across subjects brings the advantage that all effects come from the variation in 
choices rather than also from the variation in the self-reported background consumptions, which may be noisy. We check the 
robustness by setting � as individual background consumption, and average/individual background consumption combined 
with the participation fee (See Appendix B). The results are basically the same.  
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�� + ���+� + � = {ሺߚ���ሻ ଵ�−ଵ, if � = Ͳሺ���ሻ ଵ�−ଵ, if � > Ͳ. 
Taking logs gives a linear equation ln ( �� + ���+� + �) = ( ln ߚߙ − ͳ) ∙ ͳ�=଴ + ( ln ��ߙ − ͳ) + ( ͳߙ − ͳ) ∙ ln� 
where ͳ�=଴ is the indicator for the Present Group.  
The parameters to be estimated are the present bias parameter, ߚ, the discount 
factor, �, and the CRRA curvature parameter, ߙ. The present bias parameter is 
identified by the differences in allocation between the Present Group and the 
Delayed Group. If there is a present bias, subjects in the Present Group will allocate 
more tokens to the sooner date than those in the Delayed Group. The discount factor 
is identified by one’s average choice across different experimental interest rates.  A 
more patient subject will allocate more tokens to the later date in all decisions. The 
curvature parameter is identified by the dispersion of one’s choices across interest 
rates. Those who consider rewards highly substitutable over time are likely to make 
corner choices in all decisions, while those with lower elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution will make choices closer to equal splits.  
Following the practice in previous studies (Andreoni and Sprenger 2012; and 
Augenblick, Niederle and Sprenger 2015), we assume a normally distributed error 
term additive to the log allocation ratio and take censoring into consideration, then 
we yield the two-limit Tobit model:  ݈௜,௝,௞∗ ≡ ln ቆ ��;௜,௝,௞∗ + ���+�;௜,௝,௞∗ + �ቇ = ( ln ߚߙ − ͳ) ∙ ͳ�=଴;௜ + ( ln ��ߙ − ͳ) + ( ͳߙ − ͳ) ln �௝ + �௜,௝,௞, �௜,௝,௞~�ሺͲ, �௞ሻ 
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݈௜,௝,௞ =
{  
   
 ln �݉௞ + � , if ݈௜,௝,௞∗ ൑ ln �݉௞ + �݈௜,௝,௞∗ , if ln �݉௞ + � < ݈௜,௝,௞∗ < ln݉௞�௝ + ��ln݉௞�௝ + �� , if ݈௜,௝,௞∗ ൒ ln݉௞�௝ + ��
 
where ݅ = ͳ,… ,ʹͲ͵ denotes Subject ݅, ݆ = ͳ,… ,͹ denotes Interest rate ݆, and ݇ =ͳ, … ,ͷ denotes Magnitude ݇. The error term is allowed to vary across magnitudes 
since giving a larger number of tokens might induce a larger noise, which might be 
a competing explanation of a larger sensitivity to the interest rate.  
The model is estimated by the quasi-maximum-likelihood method: when 
performing the estimation, the error term, � , is assumed to be i.i.d., while in 
computing the standard errors, the error term is assumed to be independent across 
subjects, but might be correlated within-subject. Estimates of the parameters can be 
recovered and standard errors can be inferred by the delta method.  
Since we are interested in the magnitude effect, we also perform the estimation 
with interaction terms of the parameters and the magnitude dummies. Thus, tests 
can be performed on the differences between the parameters for different 
magnitudes.  
In Appendix C, we assume another specification, in which the utility function is 
Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA). In that specification the background 
consumption, �, is also a parameter to be estimated. In this way, we address the 
concern that the average self-reported background consumption may not match the 
true background consumption integrated with the experimental rewards in decision 
making, or the coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion of the utility function may not 
be constant (i.e. the CRRA utility function is misspecified). The results are basically 
the same.  
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2. Results 
Table 4 reports the magnitude-invariant estimates and the magnitude-specific 
estimates of the parameters, respectively. A salient feature is that none of the 
estimates of ߚ is significantly different from 1, implying no evidence of present 
bias, which is consistent with our finding in the model-free analysis. The annual 
discount rate for all magnitudes is 52.7%, which is in the range found by previous 
studies. The CRRA curvature parameters are always significantly smaller than 1, 
implying that the subjects on average consider the monetary rewards received on 
different dates imperfectly substitutable, which is also consistent with other studies 
(e.g. Andreoni and Sprenger 2012; Andreoni, Kuhn and Sprenger 2015; Cheung 
2015; and Augenblick, Niederle and Sprenger 2015).  
Most importantly, both the discount factor and the CRRA curvature are 
increasing in the magnitude. To judge if these magnitude effects are significant: 
Table 6 presents Wald tests over the differences of parameters between 
magnitudes.14 We find significant magnitude effects both on the discount factor, �, 
and on the exponent parameter, ߙ , which is a positive transformation of the 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The discount factor is increasing in the 
magnitude, meaning that the decision weights on later rewards shift upward when 
the total budget increases. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is increasing 
in the magnitude, meaning that the rewards on the two dates are more substitutable 
to the subjects when a larger total budget is provided. This results in choices closer 
to the two corners (to which corner depends on whether �� > ͳ). Thereby, we 
verify Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4.  
 
14
 For the other three pairs of non-adjacent magnitudes: the differences in ߚ are not significant, while the differences in �� and in ߙ are all significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 4. Discounting and Curvature Parameter Estimates in the Aggregate-level Estimation with the 
CRRA Specification 
Model: Tobit Tobit 
Magnitude: All €20 €40 €60 €80 €160 
Present bias: ̂ߚ 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.986 0.997 0.986 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) 
Discount factor over 
four weeks: � �̂ 0.968 0.948 0.961 0.971 0.972 0.982 (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
CRRA curvature: ̂ߙ 0.955 0.928 0.947 0.952 0.958 0.968 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
S.e. of the error term: �̂ 3.699 2.294 2.986 3.369 3.857 5.314 
 (0.281) (0.200) (0.245) (0.269) (0.307) (0.454) 
Log-likelihood -13678.51 -13538.56 
Observations 7,105 7,105 
Uncensored 1,969 1,969 
Clusters 203 203 
Notes: Two-limit Tobit estimators. CRRA estimation with � =7.89 (average reported background 
consumption). Column 1: assuming that parameters are invariant to magnitudes. Column 2-6: 
assuming that parameters vary with magnitudes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Log-
likelihood has been corrected for the transformation of dependent variables. Standard errors 
calculated via the delta method. 
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Table 5. Estimates of Parameter Differences between Magnitudes in the CRRA Specification 
Magnitude: €40 - €20 €60 - €40 €80 - €60 €160 - €80 €60 - €20 €80 - €40 €160 - €60 
Present bias: ̂ߚ -0.000 -0.003 0.011* -0.011 -0.003 0.008 0.000 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) 
Discount factor 
over four 
weeks:� �̂ 0.014** 0.010* 0.001 0.010** 0.024*** 0.011* 0.011* (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
CRRA 
curvature: ̂ߙ 0.018*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.011*** 0.016*** (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
S.e. of the error 
term: �̂ 0.692*** 0.383*** 0.487*** 1.457*** 1.075*** 0.871*** 1.944*** 
 (0.106) (0.092) (0.108) (0.218) (0.138) (0.125) (0.258) 
Notes: Estimates of parameter differences are inferred from the Two-limit Tobit estimation by the 
delta method. The estimation assumes CRRA utility with � =7.89. Separate parameters are 
estimated for each magnitude among €20, €40, €60, €80 and €160. There are 1,421 observations 
(203 clusters) for each magnitude. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors 
calculated via the delta method. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent 
level, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
To get an idea about the relative importance of the two channels of the magnitude 
effect, we use the estimates above to predict choices in the 35 questions for both 
the Present Group and the Delayed Group. Table 6 presents the marginal effects of 
allowing one parameter to vary with the magnitude: in each row, we allow only one 
parameter, either � or ߙ, to vary with the magnitude of the decisions (as indicated 
by the column title), but fix the other two parameters at the value estimated from 
the magnitude of €20. Each number in a cell is the total change (in unit of ��ଵ଴଴, the 
percentage of the total budget) in the seven decisions with the corresponding 
magnitude. The results show that the marginal effect of allowing ߙ to vary with the 
magnitude is at least as large as the marginal effect of allowing � to vary. This 
suggests that the magnitude effect on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is 
at least as important as the magnitude effect on the discount rate. 
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Table 6. Marginal Effects of Allowing a Parameter to Vary with Magnitudes in the CRRA Specification 
Magnitude: €40 €60 €80 €160 
Parameter values 
used in 
prediction: 
ߚଵ, �௞, ߙଵ (Delayed):  21.3 34.7 36.6 48.6 ߚଵ, �௞, ߙଵ (Present): 21.8 36.5 38.1 50.7 ߚଵ, �ଵ, ߙ௞ (Delayed): 24.8 33.9 44.4 65.5 ߚଵ, �ଵ, ߙ௞ (Present): 27.7 38.0 49.2 72.8 
Notes: The changes in choices predicted by the CRRA Tobit model using the parameter values 
indicated by the row title compared with ሺߚଵ, �ଵ, ߙଵሻ, for the two groups separately. ݇ in the row 
titles stands for the magnitude in the column title. For instance, the first cell in the first row is the 
difference between the choices made in the seven decisions with the magnitude of €40 predicted by 
the model with parameter values ሺߚଵ, �ଶ, ߙଵሻ and those predicted by the model with parameter 
values ሺߚଵ, �ଵ, ߙଵሻ. In other words, it is the marginal effect of allowing � to vary with the magnitude 
from €20 to €40. The unit is 1 percent of the total budget.  
 
B. Individual-Level Estimation 
The aggregate-level estimation provides evidence of positive magnitude effects 
on the discount factor and on intertemporal substitutability. One may wonder 
whether these results also hold at the individual level. Indeed, we find a huge 
individual heterogeneity in choices. One concern is that, when testing the 
magnitude effect on the aggregate preferences, there might be a bias resulting from 
forcing all subjects to have the same preferences and the same distribution of noise. 
To deal with this concern, we also perform individual-level estimation and tests.  
1. Estimation and testing procedure 
We keep all the assumptions that underlie equation ( 1 ) except for ߚ since it is 
not identified in individual-level estimations. We estimate the discount factor (�) 
and the intertemporal substitutability (ߙ) for each combination of subject and stake, 
and then test if the two parameters are increasing in the magnitude within-subject.  
One important difference from the aggregate-level estimation is that there might 
be an under-identification problem when a subject made no or only one interior 
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choice under a stake. Actually, there are 627 out of 1015 (62%) combinations of 
subjects and stakes suffering from such a problem. We thereby adopt a conservative 
way to test the magnitude effect. First, we yield point estimates of �  and ߙ  if 
possible. Whenever there is an under-identification problem, we remove the error 
term from ( 1 ) and then infer the intervals of �  and ߙ  that can generate the 
observations.  Second, we perform a one-tailed sign test on the two parameters, 
respectively, with the null hypotheses that they do not change with the magnitude. 
The sign test only requires that the distribution of a parameter does not differ 
between magnitudes, while it allows the distribution to be different across subjects. 
For a comparison between a point estimate and an interval estimate, we recognize 
a difference only if the point is not in the interior of the interval. For a comparison 
between two interval estimates, we recognize a difference if the two intervals do 
not overlap.  
2. Results 
Table 7 shows the results of the tests at the individual level. We reject the null 
hypotheses of no magnitude effect on the two parameters, in favor of positive 
magnitude effects. This shows that the two channels of the magnitude effect on 
intertemporal choices are robust against individual heterogeneity.  
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Table 7. Sign tests on preference parameters between magnitudes 
  €20 ~ €40 €40 ~ €60 €60 ~ €80 €80 ~ €160 €20 ~ €60 €40 ~ €80 €60 ~ €160 
Discount 
factor 
over four 
weeks: � �̂ 
#increase 
 /unchanged 
 /decrease 
 31% 
/48% 
/21% 
 31% 
/51% 
/19% 
 26% 
/56% 
/18% 
 23% 
/58% 
/19% 
 36% 
/48% 
/16% 
 34% 
/50% 
/16% 
 29% 
/54% 
/17% 
p-value 0.0255** 0.0107** 0.0687* 0.2253 0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0086*** 
CRRA 
curvature: ̂ߙ #increase  /unchanged  /decrease  30% /61% /  9%  28% /60% /12%  24% /63% /13%  27% /64% /  9%  31% /62% /  8%  29% /61% /10%  29% /63% /  9% 
 p-value 0.0000*** 0.0002*** 0.0101** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Notes: Right-tailed sign tests on the differences of parameters between two magnitudes. 203 sets of 
observations for each magnitude. � = ͹.ͺͺͺ. When under-identification occurs, interval estimates 
are yielded for the two preference parameters. A point estimate and an interval estimate are 
considered to be different only if the point is not in the interior of the interval. Two interval estimates 
are considered to be different only if their intersection is empty or a singleton. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
V. Interpretations 
The results above imply that when an average subject faces a larger budget in an 
intertemporal allocation task, she behaves more patiently, but also she regards 
rewards to be more substitutable between dates.  
A. Relation with the Magnitude Effect on Risk Aversion 
According to the Discounted Expected Utility (DEU) theory, the risk attitude and 
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution are represented by the same parameters, 
since risk aversion and imperfect fungibility both originate from diminishing 
marginal utility. Therefore, one may wonder whether the magnitude effect on 
intertemporal substitutability is the same as the magnitude effect on risk attitudes.  
We find evidence against this equivalence when we compare our results with 
previous findings. Holt and Laury (2002) investigated the magnitude effect on risk 
attitudes with Multiple Price List (MPL) questions. They found a significant, 
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positive magnitude effect: when faced with a larger magnitude, people appear to be 
more risk averse in terms of the relative risk aversion. This is in the opposite 
direction against what we find. Their finding suggests an increase in the concavity 
as the magnitude increases while ours shows a movement towards linearity. This 
contradiction suggests that the magnitude effect on relative risk aversion is not 
driving the magnitude effect on intertemporal substitutability.  
Some other studies also suggest that risk aversion and intertemporal 
substitutability should be separated. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) found no 
significant correlation at the individual level between the curvature estimated by 
the CTB method and the risk attitude elicited by the MPL method. Abdellaoui, 
Bleichrodt, l’Haridon and Paraschiv (2013b), Miao and Zhong (2015) and Cheung 
(2015) also found that the utility curvature elicited from intertemporal tasks is 
quantitatively different from that elicited from tasks with risk. We provide evidence 
from a different perspective: while the previous studies showed that the degrees of 
concavity are different for the two kinds of utility functions, we show that the 
degrees of concavity change in opposite directions when the stake is varied.  
This finding has implications for both theories and experimental methods. First, 
it lends support to the theories which separate intertemporal substitutability from 
risk aversion, such as Epstein and Zin (1989). Second, it casts doubt on the use of 
a risk-elicitation task to correct for the curvature when eliciting time preferences.  
B. Relation with Borrowing Constraints 
In theory, a binding borrowing constraint can lead to a magnitude effect on the 
monetary discount rate in a single-reward task if the background consumption is 
expected to grow over time, as shown by Epper (2015). However, Meier and 
Sprenger (2010) found that experimentally elicited long-run discount rates are 
uncorrelated with credit constraints, suggesting that on average, whether the 
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borrowing constraint is binding does not affect intertemporal choices in 
experiments.  
Moreover, given the fact that subjects may have savings which provide some but 
small liquidity, the number of subjects whose borrowing constraints are binding 
should be increasing in the stake. For this reason, if the borrowing constraint is a 
main issue, we should observe that the intertemporal substitutability is decreasing 
in the stake, which is inconsistent with our results. Therefore, we believe that a 
binding borrowing constraint is not the main driver of our results.  
C. Relation with Existing Theories 
We discuss the implications of our empirical findings for some theories that may 
explain the two channels of the magnitude effect.  
One model that can account for the magnitude effect on the discount factor was 
proposed by Benhabib et al. (2010). They developed a model with a fixed cost of 
delaying rewards. The idea is that whenever a delayed reward is chosen, a fixed 
cost is incurred, so that as the stake increases, the cost becomes relatively less 
important and hence the subject appears more patient.  
Noor (2011) proposed a model of magnitude-dependent discounting, which leads 
to similar predictions. In his model, the discount function is increasing in the utility 
at the later period. As the stake gets larger, the discount function converges to 1.15 
One theory that can explain the magnitude effect on intertemporal substitutability 
is an extended version of the dual-self bank-nightclub model of Fudenberg and 
Levine (2006). In the original model, the agent first chooses the amount of pocket 
cash when no temptation is present, and then she chooses the amount of 
consumption when a windfall is available and temptation plays a role. The strategy 
 
15
 Baucells and Heukamp (2012) extend the magnitude-dependent discounting model to allow risks.  
33 
 
for utility maximization is to spend all of the windfall when it is small but try to 
save some money out of the windfall when it is large. A small windfall is not 
integrated with the lifelong wealth, because the agent does not bother to perform 
self-control, but it is worth controlling oneself when the windfall is large. As a 
result, the utility function for windfalls is much more concave when the size of the 
windfall is below a certain threshold than when it is above the threshold.  
The model can explain a magnitude effect on intertemporal substitutability if we 
impose the assumption that an agent who anticipates a reward in the future does not 
immediately adjust her cash allocation plan. Instead, she keeps the anticipated 
reward in the mental account of windfalls until it is received and part of it is 
consumed. Only after the remainder is moved into the mental account of savings 
does she reschedule her future consumption.  
When this assumption is used, the model predicts that a subject is likely to make 
interior choices when the budget is small, i.e., below the threshold induced by the 
self-control costs. Since the utility function for windfalls is very concave the subject 
balances extra consumption on the sooner date and on the later date. As the budget 
increases above the threshold, the subject likes to save part of it for consumption 
smoothing. Since the utility function for savings is much less concave (close to 
linear), these savings will be allocated fully to either the sooner date (when the 
interest rate is small) or the later date (when the interest rate is large). Hence, as the 
budget increases the intertemporal substitutability increases and it will appear as if 
the utility function has become less concave (see Appendix D for a simulation).  
Another model that can explain the magnitude effect on intertemporal 
substitutability is the mental zooming theory proposed by Holden and Quiggin 
(2017). The theory presumes that people integrate more background consumption 
with the experimental reward as the size of the reward increases. If the budget 
increases, individuals 'zoom out' as it were, and take a broader perspective in the 
decision problem. One reason may be that individuals are likely to divide and use 
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up a bigger windfall over a longer time period. Based on the data collected from 
their field experiment with Malawian peasants, Holden and Quiggin showed that 
the magnitude effect on the discount rate in single-reward tasks would disappear if 
the unobserved background consumption is assumed to be an increasing function 
of the stake.  
In intertemporal allocation tasks, the increasing background consumption can 
generate a magnitude effect on intertemporal substitutability. To see why, denote 
the observed elasticity of intertemporal substitution in experimental rewards by ��. 
The relationship between �� and preference parameters is �� = ͳͳ − ߙ ∙ log ቀ��+� �� ቁlog ቀ��+� + ��� + � ቁ. 
Since �� is increasing in both ߙ and �, an increase in ߙ and an increase in � are 
competing explanations for the magnitude effect on intertemporal substitutability. 
If subjects take into account more background consumption as the total budget 
increases, we would observe a greater sensitivity to the interest rate, i.e. a greater ��. When we assume a fixed background consumption, however, the pattern will 
be attributed to a magnitude effect on ߙ.  
Both the mental-accounting Fudenberg-Levine model and the mental zooming 
theory point to partial integration with lifelong wealth, which seems to be an 
important mechanism of the magnitude effect on intertemporal substitutability. 
Andersen et al. (2018) showed empirically that subjects only partially integrate 
experimental rewards with wealth in risk preference tasks. While they provide 
evidence of partial asset integration by exploiting variation in personal wealth, we 
provide within-subject evidence suggesting that the degree of asset integration is 
increasing in the stake.  
None of the current models can explain both a magnitude effect on the discount 
factor and a magnitude effect on the intertemporal substitutability. Of course, the 
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two channels can be explained by a mode-switching model in which individuals are 
assumed to have different preferences for different stakes. However, a truly unified 
explanation is still lacking.  
VI. Conclusion 
Our study investigates the magnitude effect on intertemporal choices in a setting 
that is more general than a single-reward task, namely the intertemporal allocation 
task. After adapting the definition to the new task, we verify the existence of a 
magnitude effect: people allocate a larger share of budget to the later reward as the 
total budget increases. The magnitude effect is not affected by whether the sooner 
reward is immediate or in the future. The size of the magnitude effect is smaller 
when the stakes are higher.  
We then look deeper into the effect, by exploring the channels. The results 
underscore the importance of a dimension which is often overlooked, namely, the 
intertemporal substitutability. We find evidence that both discount factor and 
intertemporal substitutability change with the magnitude of rewards. The 
magnitude effect on intertemporal substitutability is not riven by the magnitude 
effect on risk attitudes, since the two magnitude effects are in the opposite 
directions. 
Some existing theories may provide explanations for one of the two channels. A 
cost-of-delay model (Benhabib et al. 2010) or a magnitude-dependent discounting 
model (Noor 2011; Baucells and Heukamp 2012) can account for a magnitude 
effect on the discount factor. Models which allow the degree of asset integration 
(mental accounting) to vary with the size of the budget can explain a magnitude 
effect on intertemporal substitutability. However, a new theory would be needed to 
account for both channels simultaneously and in a unified way.  
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Appendix A. Rationality of Subjects in the Convex Time Budget Method 
The CTB method allows subjects to make interior choices, and hence makes it 
possible to measure discount rates and utility curvature simultaneously. However, 
Chakraborty, Calford, Fenig and Halevy (2017) found that a proportion of subjects, 
especially those who make interior choices, violate wealth monotonicity in the CTB 
dataset of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) and that the magnitude of wealth 
monotonicity violations conditional on violating at least once are as large as that 
generated by uniform random choice, and hence questioned the rationality of 
subjects in making CTB decisions.  
In this appendix, we follow Chakraborty et al. (2017) to examine price 
monotonicity and wealth monotonicity of our dataset. In specific, we look at 
fractions of monotonicity violations among all subjects and among subjects who 
make at least one interior choice, respectively. We also measure the average 
magnitude of wealth monotonicity violations for those who violate wealth 
monotonicity at least once, and we compare it with the distribution of the magnitude 
generated by uniform random choice.  
One advantage of our sample in testing wealth monotonicity is that we have 70 
pairs of tasks that only differ in total budget for each subject, compared to one pair 
in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). This endows our test with greater power than that 
in Chakraborty et al. (2017).  
Table A 1 shows the rationality indices of the full sample and the subsamples as 
well as those generated by uniform random choice. The fractions of price 
monotonicity violations (2-3%) are less than the fractions of wealth monotonicity 
violations (10-20%). A possible reason is that prices are varied within decision 
forms but total budgets are varied across decision forms, and hence it is easier to 
make comparison across prices than across total budgets. Nevertheless, those 
fractions and the magnitudes of violations are much lower than those generated by 
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uniform random choice, suggesting that our dataset and the subsample of subjects 
who make interior choices are highly informative.  
Table A 1. Rationality of Subjects Compared to Uniform Random Choice 
 Fraction of price 
monotonicity 
violations 
Average 
magnitude of 
price 
monotonicity 
violations 
(euros) 
Fraction of 
wealth 
monotonicity 
violations 
Average 
magnitude of 
wealth 
monotonicity 
violations 
(euros) 
Full sample 0.022 0.13 0.101 0.82 
Subjects who 
make at least 
one interior 
choice 
0.037 0.23 0.155 1.03 
Subjects who 
violate wealth 
monotonicity at 
least once  
0.033 0.26 0.208 1.67 
Mean of 
uniform random 
choice 
(Standard 
deviation) 
0.429 
(0.006) 
8.12 
(0.21) 
0.297 
(0.008) 
2.69 
(0.10) 
Notes: The first three rows present fractions of price monotonicity violations and wealth 
monotonicity violations as well as average magnitudes of violations in terms of euros in the full 
sample, the subsample of subjects who make at least one interior choice, and the subsample of 
subjects who violate wealth monotonicity at least once. The last row presents the means and the 
standard deviations of the same four indices generated by uniform random choice. The means and 
standard errors are calculated by simulating 10,000 times.  
Appendix B. Parametric Analysis with Different Assumptions on � 
We check the sensitivity of the parameter estimates (Table A 2) and the 
magnitude effects (Table A 3) to alternative assumptions on the background 
consumption. The results show that the magnitude effects on the discount factor 
and on intertemporal substitutability are robust, except when � is assumed to be 
very small. However, with a small background consumption, one should rarely 
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make corner choices due to the motivation of consumption smoothing. But we do 
observe many corner choices in our sample. Hence, the case with a small � is 
unlikely to be true.  
Table A 2. Background Consumption, Parameter Estimates and Likelihood 
 Model: Tobit Tobit 
 Magnitude: All €20 €40 €60 €80 €160 � = ͹.ͺͻ  Present bias: ̂ߚ 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.986 0.997 0.986 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.020) 
Discount factor 
over four weeks: � �̂ 0.968 0.948 0.961 0.971 0.972 0.982 (0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
CRRA 
curvature: ̂ߙ 0.955 0.928 0.947 0.952 0.958 0.968 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
S.e of the error 
term: �̂ 3.699 2.294 2.986 3.369 3.857 5.314 
(0.281) (0.200) (0.245) (0.269) (0.307) (0.454) 
Log-likelihood -13678.51 -13538.56 � = maxሺ�௜ , Ͳ.Ͳͳሻ Present bias: ̂ߚ 0.990 0.989 0.990 0.987 0.998 0.987 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) 
Discount factor 
over four weeks: � �̂ 0.968 0.948 0.962 0.971 0.972 0.982 (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
CRRA 
curvature: ̂ߙ 0.962 0.945 0.956 0.960 0.964 0.972 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
S.e of the error 
term: �̂ 4.422 3.048 3.716 4.102 4.570 6.115 
(0.358) (0.300) (0.315) (0.328) (0.370) (0.552) 
Log-likelihood -13920.57 -13815.64 � = ͳʹ.ͺͻ Present bias: ̂ߚ 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.985 0.997 0.986 
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 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) 
Discount factor 
over four weeks: � �̂ 0.969 0.948 0.962 0.972 0.973 0.982 (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
CRRA 
curvature: ̂ߙ 0.945 0.903 0.932 0.940 0.948 0.963 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
S.e of the error 
term: �̂ 3.013 1.697 2.329 2.698 3.144 4.490 
(0.229) (0.147) (0.187) (0.214) (0.262) (0.384) 
Log-likelihood -13623.90 -13443.15 � = �௜ + ͷ Present bias: ̂ߚ 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.987 0.998 0.987 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Discount factor 
over four weeks: � �̂ 0.968 0.948 0.962 0.971 0.972 0.982 (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
CRRA 
curvature: ̂ߙ 0.948 0.912 0.936 0.944 0.951 0.964 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
S.e of the error 
term: �̂ 3.213 1.870 2.529 2.899 3.355 4.430 
(0.246) (0.163) (0.205) (0.231) (0.275) (0.398) 
Log-likelihood -13693.32 -13527.03 � = Ͳ.Ͳͳ Present bias: ̂ߚ 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.987 0.998 0.986 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) 
Discount factor 
over four weeks: � �̂ 0.964 0.945 0.959 0.968 0.969 0.980 (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) 
CRRA 
curvature: ̂ߙ 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
S.e of the error 
term: �̂ 15.333 14.511 14.500 14.470 15.251 17.613 
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(1.216) (1.239) (1.154) (1.115) (1.220) (1.478) 
Log-likelihood -15596.78 -15575.13 
 Observations 7,105 7,105 
 Uncensored 1,969 1,969 
 Clusters 203 203 
Notes: Two-limit Tobit estimators. Panel 1: � = average reported background consumption. Panel 
2: � = individual reported background consumption (except for one subject, we replace the zero 
consumption with 0.01). Panel 3: � =  average reported background consumption plus the 
participation fee. Panel 4: � = individual background consumption plus the participation fee. 
Panel 5: � = Ͳ.Ͳͳ. Column 1: assuming that parameters are invariant to magnitudes. Column 2-
6: assuming that parameters vary with magnitudes. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Log-
likelihood has been corrected for the transformation of dependent variables. Standard errors 
calculated via the delta method. 
 
Table A 3. Background Consumption and Magnitude Effects 
  Magnitude: €40 - €20 €60 - €40 €80 - €60 €160 - 
€80 
€60 - €20 €80 - €40 €160 - 
€60 � = ͹.ͺͻ  Present bias: ̂ߚ -0.000 -0.003 0.011* -0.011 -0.003 0.008 0.000 
Discount factor over 
four weeks: �� 0.014** 0.010* 0.001 0.010** 0.024*** 0.011* 0.011* 
CRRA curvature: ̂ߙ 0.018*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 
S.e of the error 
term: �̂ 0.692*** 0.383*** 0.487*** 1.457*** 1.075*** 0.871*** 1.944*** � = maxሺ�௜ , Ͳ.Ͳͳሻ Present bias: ̂ߚ 0.001 -0.003 0.011* -0.011 -0.002 0.008 -0.000 
Discount factor over 
four weeks: �� 0.013** 0.010** 0.001 0.010** 0.023*** 0.010* 0.011* 
CRRA curvature: ̂ߙ 0.011*** 0.004** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.015*** 0.008*** 0.012*** 
S.e of the error 
term: �̂ 0.668*** 0.386*** 0.468*** 1.545*** 1.054*** 0.854*** 2.013*** � = ͳʹ.ͺͻ Present bias: ̂ߚ -0.000 -0.003 0.011* -0.011 -0.003 0.008 0.000 
Discount factor over 
four weeks: �� 0.014*** 0.010** 0.001 0.010** 0.024*** 0.011* 0.011* 
CRRA curvature: ̂ߙ 0.028*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.037*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 
S.e of the error 
term: �̂ 0.632*** 0.370*** 0.446*** 1.346*** 1.002*** 0.815*** 1.792*** � = �௜ + ͷ Present bias: ̂ߚ 0.001 -0.003 0.011* -0.011 -0.002 0.008 -0.000 
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Discount factor over 
four weeks: �� 0.014*** 0.010* 0.001 0.010** 0.023*** 0.011* 0.011* 
CRRA curvature: ̂ߙ 0.025*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.032*** 0.015*** 0.020*** 
S.e of the error 
term: �̂ 0.659*** 0.371*** 0.456*** 1.374*** 1.030*** 0.827*** 1.830*** � = Ͳ.Ͳͳ Present bias: ̂ߚ -0.000 -0.002 0.010 -0.011 -0.003 0.008 -0.001 
 Discount factor over 
four weeks: �� 0.014** 0.009 0.001 0.011** 0.023*** 0.010 0.011* 
 CRRA curvature: ̂ߙ 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001*** -0.000 0.000 0.002*** 
 S.e of the error 
term: �̂ -0.011 -0.030 0.781* 2.362*** -0.041 0.751 3.143*** 
Notes: Estimates of parameter differences are inferred from the Two-limit Tobit estimation by the 
delta method. Parameters are separately set for each magnitude among €20, €40, €60, €80 and €160. 
Panel 1: � =  average reported background consumption. Panel 2: � =  individual reported 
background consumption (except for one subject, we replace the zero consumption with 0.01). Panel 
3: � =  average reported background consumption plus the participation fee. Panel 4: � = 
individual background consumption plus the participation fee. Panel 5: � = Ͳ.Ͳͳ. There are 1,421 
observations (203 clusters) for each magnitude. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Standard 
errors calculated via the delta method. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1 percent level, 5 
percent level, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
Appendix C. Parametric Analysis with Estimation of � 
The CRRA specification with exogenously set � is simple and easy to estimate, 
however, one may suspect that the average self-reported background consumption 
does not match the true background consumption integrated with the experimental 
rewards in decision making, or the utility function is misspecified. In particular, if 
the utility function is Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA), � in ( 1 ) does 
not represent the background consumption but is a mixture of the background 
consumption and the HARA intercept parameter.  
In order to meet the challenges above, we estimate �  instead of setting it 
exogenously. By doing this, we “let the data tell” what values are suitable for �, 
and we can also identify the magnitude effects on �.  
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1. Model 
We assume a normally distributed error term at the choice level. The error term 
can be arisen either because of idiosyncratic shocks in preference or because of 
imprecision in placing the scrollbar.16 In specific, a latent choice is 
��;௜,௝,௞∗ =
{   
   
  ݉ − ቆ(ߚ��௝) ଵଵ−� − ͳቇ�� + (ߚ��௝) ଵଵ−� + �௜,௝,௞ , if � = Ͳ݉ − ቆ(��௝) ଵଵ−� − ͳቇ�� + (��௝) ଵଵ−� + �௜,௝,௞, if � > Ͳ
, �௜,௝,௞~� ቀͲ, �௞ͳͲͲ݉ቁ. 
Then the choices are censored at the two corners so that the observed choices are  
��;௜,௝,௞ = {  
  Ͳ, if ��;௜,௝,௞∗ ൑ Ͳ��;௜,௝,௞∗ , if Ͳ < ��;௜,௝,௞∗ < ݉௞�௝݉௞�௝ , if ��;௜,௝,௞∗ ൒ ݉௞�௝ . 
This is a two-limit nonlinear censored model, which can be estimated by the quasi-
maximum likelihood method.  
2. Results 
Table A 4 reports the estimates of the parameters from the specifications with 
magnitude-invariant parameters and with magnitude-specific parameters, 
respectively.  
Table A 5 presents the estimates of the parameter differences between 
magnitudes. We find a significant magnitude effect on the discount rate. The 
 
16
 In the model with a normally distributed error term additive to the log allocation ratio, the estimator of � is nonlinear 
in the error term. Simulation shows that the estimator of �  is severely biased given our sample size, though it is 
asymptotically consistent. The model we assume here is the same as the one implicitly assumed by Andreoni and Sprenger 
(2012) when they perform the nonlinear least square (NLS) estimation. The difference is that we employ the quasi-maximum 
likelihood estimation, by which we take into account censoring.  
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magnitude effect on the exponent parameter, ߙ, is only significant between the 
magnitudes of €20 and €40. This is reasonable since we find a strong magnitude 
effect on the background consumption and the HARA intercept parameter (i.e. �), 
which have explained most of the magnitude effects on intertemporal 
substitutability.  
Table A 4. Discounting and Curvature Parameter Estimates in the Aggregate-level Estimation with the 
HARA specification 
Model: Nonlinear 
Censored 
Nonlinear Censored 
Magnitude: All €20 €40 €60 €80 €160 
Present bias: ̂ߚ 1.000 0.994 1.002 1.000 1.000 0.997 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Discount factor over four 
weeks: � �̂ 0.953 0.952 0.960 0.962 0.965 0.967 (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Curvature parameter: ̂ߙ 0.997 0.964 0.984 0.982 0.984 0.986 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Background 
consumption and HARA 
intercept: �̂ 9.556 10.713 15.790 22.551 30.834 67.814 (2.046) (2.209) (3.364) (4.461) (5.896) (12.598) 
S.d. of the error term: �̂ 63.948 78.491 68.110 62.147 62.426 65.890 
 (4.843) (6.835) (5.468) (4.771) (5.010) (5.700) 
Log-likelihood -
13136.00 
-12836.01 
Observations 7,105 7,105 
Uncensored 1,969 1,969 
Clusters 203 203 
Notes: Quasi-Maximum Likelihood estimators. Column 1: assuming that parameters are the same 
across magnitudes. Column 2-6: assuming that parameters vary with magnitudes. Clustered standard 
errors in parentheses. Standard errors calculated via the delta method. 
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Table A 5. Estimates of Parameter Differences between Magnitudes in the HARA specification 
Magnitude: €40 - €20 €60 - €40 €80 - €60 €160 - €80 €60 - €20 €80 - €40 €160 - €60 
Present bias: ̂ߚ 0.00807 -0.00180 0.00038 -0.00303 0.00572 -0.00197 -0.00265 
(0.00552) (0.00206) (0.00241) (0.00249) (0.00578) (0.00255) (0.00296) 
Discount 
factor over 
four weeks: � �̂ 0.00734 0.00252* 0.00258 0.00267* 0.00986* 0.00510*** 0.00526** (0.00570) (0.00138) (0.00169) (0.00141) (0.00574) (0.00176) (0.00215) 
Curvature 
parameter: ̂ߙ 0.02007*** 0.00097 0.00192 -0.00219 0.01827** 0.00012 0.00411 (0.00737) (0.00370) (0.00225) (0.00170) (0.00726) (0.00459) (0.00269) 
Background 
consumption 
and HARA 
intercept: �̂ 
5.077*** 6.761*** 8.283*** 36.981*** 11.838*** 15.044*** 45.263*** 
(1.959) (1.992) (2.471) (7.505) (2.932) (3.551) (8.805) 
Notes: Estimates of parameter differences are inferred from the quasi-maximum likelihood 
estimates by the delta method. Parameters are separately set for each magnitude among €20, €40, 
€60, €80 and €160. There are 1,421 observations (203 clusters) for each magnitude. Clustered 
standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors calculated via the delta method. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1 percent level, 5 percent level, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
As we do for the CRRA specification, we use the estimates to predict choices in 
the 35 questions for both the Present Group and the Delayed Group. Table A 6 
presents the marginal effects of allowing parameters to vary with the magnitude: in 
Row 1-2, we allow � to vary with the magnitude of the decisions (as indicated by 
the column title), but control other two parameters to be the value estimated from 
the magnitude of €20; in Row 3-4, we allow ߙ and � to vary with the magnitude. 
The results show that the marginal effect of allowing ߙ and � to vary with the 
magnitude is comparable with the marginal effect of allowing �  to vary. It is 
consistent with our finding in the Tobit estimation, which implies that the 
magnitude effect on intertemporal substitutability is at least equally important as 
the magnitude effect on the discount rate. The fact that the magnitude effect on � 
is strongly significant is in particular consistent with the story that the degree of 
asset integration is increasing in the magnitude of rewards.  
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Table A 6. Marginal Effects of Allowing a Parameter to Vary with Magnitudes in the HARA 
specification 
Magnitude: €40 €60 €80 €160 
Parameter values 
used in prediction: 
ߚଵ, �௞, ߙଵ, �ଵ 
(Delayed):  
13.9 22.0 25.9 28.0 ߚଵ, �௞, ߙଵ, �ଵ 
(Present): 
17.3 22.1 26.0 28.1 ߚଵ, �ଵ, ߙ௞ , �௞ 
(Delayed): 
8.5 19.4 26.1 36.5 ߚଵ, �ଵ, ߙ௞ , �௞ 
(Present): 
10.9 21.7 29.0 40.2 
Notes: The changes in choices predicted by the HARA nonlinear censored model using the 
parameter values indicated by the row title compared with ሺߚଵ, �ଵ, ߙଵ, �ଵሻ, for the two groups 
separately. ݇ in the row titles stands for the magnitude in the column title. For instance, the first cell 
in the first row is the difference between the choices made in the seven decisions with the magnitude 
of €40 predicted by the model with parameter values ሺߚଵ, �௞, ߙଵ, �ଵሻ and those predicted by the 
model with parameter values ሺߚଵ, �ଵ, ߙଵ, �ଵሻ. In other words, it is the marginal effect of allowing � 
to vary with the magnitude from €20 to €40.  
 
Appendix D. A Simulation of the Mental-Accounting Fudenberg-Levine 
Model 
We perform a simulation according to the mental-accounting Fudenberg-Levine 
model described in Section V. Figure A 1 shows how the dependent variable in our 
Tobit estimation, ln ቀ �೟+��೟+�+�ቁ, changes with the independent variable, ln �.  
Figure A 1(a) displays the curves in case the true model is specified by equation 
( 1 ). Note that the slope of the curve (when it is not censored) is ଵଵ−�. Thus a greater 
slope stands for a larger intertemporal substitutability. The horizontal-axis intercept 
is − ln � . Thus a greater horizontal-axis intercept stands for a smaller discount 
factor.  
Figure A 1(b) displays the curves in case the true model is the mental-accounting 
Fudenberg-Levine model. When the budget is €20, both rewards are taken as pocket 
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cash, so the curve is a straight line, as same as predicted by ( 1 ). However, when 
the budget gets larger, a large fraction of money is saved, and hence the curve is 
with a greater slope. Therefore, we observe a positive relation between 
intertemporal substitutability and the size of budget. On the other hand, the 
horizontal-axis intercept does not change with the stake, suggesting that the model 
cannot explain the magnitude effect on the discount factor. 
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(a)  Prediction of the model specified by equation ( 1 ) 
 
(b) Prediction of the extended Fudenberg-Levine model 
Figure A 1. Simulated Relationships between the Dependent Variable and the Independent Variable 
of the Tobit Estimation 
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Appendix E. Decision Forms in Part II 
 
(a) The Present Group 
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(b) The Delayed Group 
Figure A 2. Interface of a Typical Decision Form in Part II 
